Since there has been much discussion lately about the computational or non-computational nature of cognition, it is worth pointing out that Fodor's position endorses a computational account of thought, but a non-computational account of semantics.
In chapter 2 Fodor discusses what he considers "five not negotiable conditions on a theory of concepts" (p. 23-28):
1. Concepts are mental particulars; ... 4. Quite a lot of concepts must turn out to be learned.
5. Concepts are public; they're the sorts of things that lots of people can, and do, share.
Concepts as Definitions?
In chapters 3 and 4 Fodor discusses linguistic and philosophical theories of concepts as definitions. An example of this view is to say that a bachelor might be defined as an unmarried male, and hence the mental representation BACHELOR 2 could not be entertained without entertaining the mental representations UNMARRIED and MALE. Thus the view of concepts as definitions is a form of IRS since it implies that the concept BACHELOR is not only determined by its own relation to the world (informational semantics), but determined by its inferential relations to other concepts, such as UNMARRIED. Definitions do, at least partly, satisfy all five of Fodor's above conditions. Nevertheless, Fodor points out that many psychologists and philosophers now are "very sceptical about definitions" and discusses a number of reasons for this, including that "practically all words (/concepts) are undefinable".
Arguments by Jackendoff and Pinker to the contrary are discussed in detail and rejected in chapter 3. For example, Jackendoff's (1992) proposal that a polysemous concept like KEEP, which can be used differently in different semantic fields, e.g. 'to keep the money', 'to keep the crowd happy', etc., could still be generally defined as CAUSE A STATE THAT ENDURES OVER TIME, is rejected as follows:
[I]f you're committed to keep being definable, and to its having the same definition in each semantic field, then you will have to face the task of saying, in words other than 'keep', what relation it is that keeping the money and the crowd happy both instance. But, I would have thought, saying what relation they both instance is precisely what the word 'keep' is for; why on earth do you suppose that you can say it 'in other words'? (p. 55)
In similar style chapter 4 discusses philosophical theories of definitions providing intrinsic connections among concepts, e.g. such as between BACHELOR and UNMARRIED. Fodor rejects this idea, concluding that "intuitions of conceptual connectedness are a sort of normal illusion", and further outlines his theory of Informational Semantics:
Informational semantics denies that "dog" means dog because of the way that it is related to other linguistic expressions ("animal" or "barks", as it might be). (p. 73)
[S]emantic facts are somehow constituted by nomic relations. To a zero'th approximation, the fact that DOG means dog (and hence the fact "dog" does) is constituted by a nomic connection between two properties of dogs; viz. being dogs and being causes of actual and possible DOG tokenings in us. (p. 73)
As mechanisms of semantic access, viz. the causal process that makes mental structures resonate with, for example, dogs, first and foremost perceptual mechanisms are discussed, but also a number of others, such as theoretical inference and 'gossip', viz. indirect access through others.
Concepts as Prototypes?
In Chapter 5 Fodor discusses statistical theories of concepts as prototypes, "the course that much of cognitive science has taken in the last decade or so". Prototypes are "bundles of statistically reliable features", and can therefore be considered a variation of the notion of concepts as definitions. Here Fodor discusses in detail compositionality as the necessary basis of systematicity and productivity of concepts (unfortunately ignoring much recent work on connectionist accounts of systematicity), and rejects prototype theories due to the fact that prototypes are noncompositional.
In a nutshell, the trouble with prototypes is this. Concepts are productive and systematic.
Since compositionality is what explains systematicity and productivity, it must be that concepts are compositional. But it's as certain as anything ever gets in cognitive science that prototypes don't compose. So, it's as certain as anything ever gets in cognitive science that concepts can't be prototypes and that the glue that holds concepts together can't be statistical. (p. 94)
Hence the negative conclusion concerning IRS theories of concepts in general:
As things stand, there is no version of the inferential role theory of conceptual content for which compositionality and psychological reality can both be claimed. (p.
107)
Inferential role semantics is bankrupt. Because cognitive science has swallowed Inferential Role Semantics whole, its treatment of concepts is bankrupt too; it keeps writing cheques on a theory of meaning that isn't there. (p. 108)
Informational Atomism and Mind-dependence of Concepts
In the final two chapters Fodor discusses in detail his atomistic theory of concepts and its implications. In chapter 6 the doctrine of Informational Atomism (IA) is outlined and possible objections are discussed. In particular IA seems to imply that (a) since practically every (lexical) concept, e.g. DOORKNOB, is primitive, there should be laws about all of them, including doorknobs ("But how could there be laws about doorknobs?") and (b) since most lexical concepts are primitive, they should also be innate ("But how could DOORKNOB be innate?").
Both of these objections are, however, convincingly countered by Fodor's non-cognitivist account of the mind-dependence of concepts, which is worth quoting at length:
The model, to repeat, is being red: all that's required for us to get locked to redness is that red things should reliably seem to us as they do ... Correspondingly, all that needs to be innate for RED to be acquired is whatever the mechanisms are that determine that red things strike us as they do; which is to say that all that needs to be innate is the sensorium. Ditto, mutatis mutandis, for DOORKNOB ... : what has to be innately given to get us locked to doorknobhood is whatever mechanisms are required for doorknobs to come to strike as such. Put slightly differently: if the locking story about concept possession and the mind-dependence story about the metaphysics of doorknobhood are both true, then the kind of nativism about DOORKNOB that an informational atomist has to put up with is perhaps not one of concepts but mechanisms. (p. 142)
Chapter 7 then discusses the difference between mind-dependent concepts, such as DOOR-KNOB, to which we are locked via phenomenological properties, and concepts of natural kinds, such as water, to which we can be locked via phenomenological properties or in a theory-mediated way, viz. by means of, for example, a chemical theory specifying the essence of water.
Conclusion
"Cognitive science will never be the same again" says the backcover. Well, cognitive science hasn't been the same for quite some time already, and at some points Fodor could have improved the book by addressing the relation between his internal critique of RTM and more RTM-critical work. His views on mind-dependence, for example, are surprisingly not too far from the arguments of Varela et al. (1991) , although the latter are strictly opposed to RTM. No doubt, however, that this book makes a valuable and highly original contribution to cognitive science, in particular to the RTM camp, and it is likely to have a strong impact on future theories of concepts.
Connectionist cognitive theorists, I'm sure, will disagree with Fodor in many points. In particular, despite a decade of connectionist work to prove his earlier criticisms of connectionism as a cognitive architecture (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) wrong, Fodor still insists that connectionist networks cannot account for systematicity and compositionality. Nevertheless, connectionists should find this book worth reading, since here Fodor clearly outlines what, in his view, representational theories of mind in general, and a theory of concepts in particular, are required to cover, and it should be interesting for connectionists to investigate where exactly they agree or disagree.
Due to Fodor's discussion of mind-dependence of concepts, his emphasis of the relevance of the sensorium and his explicit commitment to a non-computational theory of semantics, this book will also be worth reading for researchers in embodied/enactive cognition, who often equate RTM with cognitivism and a commitment to objectivism, viz. the view that mental representation is internal recovery of an independently existing external world.
In summary, I enjoyed reading this book and would recommend it to anyone with an interest in theoretical cognitive science.
